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Abstract:
In the canonical model of frictionless markets, arbitrage is usually taken to force all trades of homogeneous
goods to occur at essentially the same price. In the real world, however, arbitrage possibilities are often severely
restricted and this may lead to substantial price heterogeneity. Here we focus on frictions that can be modeled
as the bargaining constraints induced by an incomplete trading network. In this context, the interplay among the
architecture of the trading network, the buyers’ valuations, and the sellers’ costs shapes the eﬀective arbitrage
possibilities of the economy. We characterize the conﬁgurations that, at an intertemporal bargaining equilib-
rium, lead to a uniform price. Conceptually, this characterization involves studying how the network positions
and valuations/costs of any given set of buyers and sellers aﬀect their collective bargaining power relative to a
notional or benchmark situation in which the connectivity is complete. Mathematically, the characterizing con-
ditions can be understood as price-based counterparts of those identiﬁed by the celebrated Marriage Theorem
in matching theory.
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1 Introduction
In this note, we study the phenomenon of price formation in a context where (heterogeneous) buyers and
sellers are subject to trading constraints (based on geography, ethnic or language considerations, trust, etc.)
that limit their bargaining or/and trading possibilities. In order to highlight the interesting interplay between
such constraints and agents’ characteristics (valuations and costs), we abstract from any other source of frictions
and assume that both buyers and sellers enjoy complete information and are arbitrarily patient. In a nutshell,
our aim is to characterize when, under the aforementioned conditions, strategic bargaining leads to an outcome
where all trade is conducted at a uniform price.
Why is this question important? Its signiﬁcance derives from the fact that such a price uniformity is one
of the key features associated to transparent and frictionless markets. It is, in a crucial sense, a feature that
underlies most of the properties of the market mechanism traditionally emphasized by economists such as, for
example, those highlighted by the two so-called Fundamental Welfare Theorems. There is the need, therefore,
to understand whether such a uniform-pricing outcome obtains even if trade is carried out in a decentralized
manner and possibly subject to substantial frictions. For, as amply documented by empirical evidence, such
frictions are substantial in almost all economic domains.1
The general mechanism through which markets typically achieve price uniformity is arbitrage. But, of
course, a minimal requirement for arbitrage to remove all price disparities is that the trading network be con-
nected i.e. a path must exist between any buyer and every seller. Otherwise, the trading network is eﬀectively
divided into separate independent sub-economies and, in general, a uniform price could not be hoped for. At
the opposite extreme, complete connectivity – with every buyer being directly linked to every seller – is obvi-
ously enough to guarantee a unique price. For, in this case, every price disparity would be readily exploited
by some (perfectly informed and inﬁnitely patient) agent. Naturally, the middle ground between complete and
minimal connectivity, i.e., an incomplete connected network, represents the truly interesting case to study. This
motivates our concrete research question: Given any proﬁle of buyers’ valuations and sellers’ costs, known to
all players, what is the family of networks that lead to a uniform equilibrium price?
To address this question, we model the bargaining setup as follows (a formal description is postponed to
Section 2). Bargaining proceeds over discrete periods and, in every one of them, some buyers and sellers are
randomly matched in pairs that are consistent with the given trading network. For each such pair, one of the
agents is chosen at random to make a proposal, which is immediately implemented if accepted. The matched
Arnold Polanski is the corresponding author.
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pairs who strike a deal leave the game and are replaced by agents with identical characteristics, while all other
players continue in the game and move into the following period.
In the setup outlined, if buyers and sellers are all homogeneous, i.e. every buyer values the single traded
good equally and the (opportunity) cost of each seller is the same, a certain answer to the question posed can
be found in Manea (2011, 2016). He proves that bilateral bargaining in a bipartite network leads to a uniform
price (i.e., the network is non-discriminatory in his terminology) if and only if for every subset of buyers, the
ratio of the number of sellers linked to (at least) one of these buyers to the number of buyers in the subset is
greater than or equal to the seller-buyer ratio in the entire network. Our main result generalizes this ﬁnding to
heterogeneous agents.
Naturally, since Manea’s model assumes that agents are homogeneous, the conditions he identiﬁes are
purely topological, i.e. concern only the architecture of the trading network. For example, with an equal num-
ber of buyers and sellers, a uniform trading price is shown to arise at equilibrium if, and only if, the trading
network admits a so-called perfect matching, i.e. a network-consistent pairing of agents where every buyer is
associated to a single distinct seller.
The situation, however, is in general very diﬀerent in a market environment that displays some heterogene-
ity in agents’ characteristics. In particular, one expects that individual valuations and costs should interplay in
a crucial way with the network architecture to yield insights that go well beyond topological considerations.
For example, consider the following network.
Let us assume ﬁrst that all buyers in the set 𝐵 and all sellers in the set 𝑆 are homogeneous, the former having
a unit valuation for the good and the latter a zero cost. Then, as agents become inﬁnitely patient (their discount
rate converges to one), it can be easily shown that in any trading component where all trade is conducted
at a uniform price, this component-speciﬁc price simply reﬂects the relative numbers of buyers and sellers
involved.2 Furthermore, it can be shown that the overall equilibrium leads to a segmentation of trade into the
components labeled 𝐺1 to 𝐺3 in Figure 1.
Figure 1 A simple seller-buyer network.
– In 𝐺1, which is balanced in the sense of including an equal number of buyers and sellers, trade takes place
at a common price 𝑝1 = 1/2.
– In 𝐺2, where the single buyer is in the “short side,” the trading price is 𝑝2 = 1/3.
– In 𝐺3, where the single seller is in the “short side,” the trading price is 𝑝3 = 2/3.
Next, we note that trade segmentation can be substantially reinforced or mitigated, depending on sellers’ costs
and buyers’ valuations. Suppose, for example, that under the same trading network as in Figure 1 the valuation
of buyer 8 is changed to 𝑣8 = 10, all other costs and valuations being kept as in the previous binary case. Then,
four trading components arise in equilibrium. One of them consists of the former𝐺2 enlargedwith sellers 2 and
5, i.e. it consists of the agents in the set {2, 3, 4, 5, 8}. This leaves buyers 9 and 10 as isolated singletons – which
means that they do not trade – and induces a residual component consisting of the set {1, 6, 7}.
Possibly a more interesting situation, somewhat polar to the previous one, obtains if we modify only the
costs of sellers 3 and 4, raising them to 𝑐3 =𝑐4 =1/4, and the valuations of buyers 9 and 10, lowering them to
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𝑣9 =𝑣10 =3/4. Then, at an equilibrium (with inﬁnitely patient players), all trade occurs at the uniform price
𝑝∗ = 1/2, which is in fact the price that would prevail if buyers and sellers were connected by a complete
bipartite network. That is, the resulting outcome is equivalent to one with complete connectivity, even though
the network architecture remains unchanged and is therefore quite incomplete.
The previous discussion illustrates the potentially rich interplay between network structure and type pro-
ﬁle. In this light, our main contribution is to provide a full and general characterization of the environments –
trading networks together with agents’ characteristics – that yield a frictionless-like (uniform-price) outcome.
As we shall see, this characterization relies on a collection of notional prices – notional in the sense of being
purely “conceptual” or “algorithmic,” i.e. not eﬀectively implemented. These diﬀerent prices, which are as-
sociated to the various possible subnetworks of the overall original network, serve the purpose of assessing
the equilibrium consistency of the uniformly prevailing price. The need to resort to such notional prices in this
case derives from the fact that, when agents are heterogeneous, the bargaining options available to the diﬀerent
agents must be evaluated in terms of the characteristics (costs and valuations) of their possible partners and
competitors to whom they are connected.
We close this introduction with a brief summary of related literature. The intertemporal bargaining ap-
proach to price determination considered here was initiated by the seminal papers by Rubinstein and Wolin-
sky (1985, 1990), Gale (1987). Their models presume that, in every period, agents are randomly matched afresh to
bargain bilaterallywith individuals on the other side of themarket. Their theoretical frameworks depend, there-
fore, on a complete social structure. Subsequent literature (e.g. Corominas-Bosch 2004; Kranton and Minehart
2001) introduced an incomplete structure into the analysis in the same way as we do here, i.e. by postulating
that a given social network restricts bilateral trading possibilities. A limiting feature of their approach is that ei-
ther the bargaining procedure or thematchingmechanism exhibits a degree of coordination that is at oddswith
the idea of decentralization that we associate to markets. The aforementioned contributions by Manea (2011,
2016) – see also Abreu and Manea (2012) – do not suﬀer from this drawback but they make the assumption
that all agents are completely homogeneous except for their connectivity. It abstracts, therefore, from the core
focus of this paper, which is the study of how the interplay between agents characteristics and network struc-
ture shapes the eﬀect of trading frictions. Nguyen (2015) generalizes Manea’s model by allowing for surplus
creation in coalitions larger than pairs and devises a simple method to solve this game in the limit as players
become arbitrarily patient. In the proof of our Lemma 1, we show how his convex program computes payoﬀs
and prices in our context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we present the model and, in Section 3, the
equilibrium notion. Then, the analysis in Section 4 starts with a brief discussion of the extreme case where the
trading network is complete. This context is analogous to that studied by Gale (1987) and represents a useful
benchmark for the analysis. We proceed in Section 5 to the study of our main case of interest where bargaining
takes place in an arbitrary trading network, possibly quite incomplete.We characterize those conﬁgurations that
lead to a uniform trading price and compare our conditions to the classical ones obtained for a pure matching
context. Section 6 concludes the main body of the paper with a summary of the main insights. For the sake
smoothness in the presentation, all proofs are included in the Appendix, although their main gist is informally
explained in the main text.
2 Model
There is a given set of sellers and a set of buyers. Each agent (buyer or seller) is connected to a certain subset
(possibly empty) of agents on the other side of the market (buyers or sellers, respectively). Such connections are
formalized through a bipartite trading network𝐺 = {𝑆 ∪ 𝐵, 𝐿}where 𝑆 is the set of sellers, 𝐵 is the set of buyers,
and 𝐿 ⊆ {𝑠𝑏 ∶ 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵} stands for the set of undirected links 𝑠𝑏 (= 𝑏𝑠) that connect some seller 𝑠 to some
buyer 𝑏. It is assumed that every seller 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 can produce at most one unit of the good being traded and incurs
a (production or opportunity) cost 𝑐u� in doing so. On the other hand, each buyer 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 cares for just one unit of
the good and has an idiosyncratic valuation 𝑣u� for it.
Time is modeled discretely, 𝑡 = 1, 2, .... At every 𝑡, the following two steps take place in sequence:
First, a certain seller-buyer matching 𝑚 = {𝑠1𝑏1 , 𝑠2𝑏2 ..., 𝑠u�𝑏u�} is selected according to some probability dis-
tribution 𝜑u� over all feasible matchings. For a matching to be feasible, it must verify two properties: (i) every
buyer and seller is included in at most one pair (possibly in none); (ii) every matched pair corresponds to a link
in the prevailing trading network 𝐺. In particular, 𝑚 can be empty or it can contain the maximum number of
non-intersecting edges (maximummatching). We need not make any assumption on how the particular match-
ing 𝑚 is selected (i.e. on the probability distribution 𝜑u�) other than supposing that every link 𝑠𝑏 in 𝐺 is chosen
with some (marginal) probability 𝜋u�u�u� that is positive.
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Second, for every pair 𝑠𝑏 ∈ 𝑚, one of the two agents is selected at random with equal probability to make a
proposal 𝑝 on the price at which trade can be conducted.
a. If this proposal is accepted, the good is transferred and the price paid. The buyer 𝑏 earns 𝑣u� − 𝑝 and the
seller 𝑝 − 𝑐u�. These two agents then leave the economy and are replaced by another buyer and seller with
the same characteristics who occupy the same network positions next period, 𝑡 + 1.
b. If the proposal is refused, then agents remain active in the same network position (with the same set of
connections) and participate in the new bargaining round taking place at 𝑡 + 1.
The replacement assumption contemplated in (a) was alreadymade by Rubinstein andWolinsky (1990) and
has become common in the recent literature on bargaining and networks (e.g., Manea 2011). It is particularly
useful because, in combination with (b), it allows to model the situation in a stationary manner and hence
consider stationary equilibria, as formulated in the next section
3 Trading Equilibrium
Given the bipartite network 𝐺 = {𝑆 ∪ 𝐵, 𝐿} and a corresponding set of costs (𝑐u�)u�∈u� and valuations (𝑣u�)u�∈u�,
the trading mechanism described above deﬁnes a sequential game form governing the bargaining process, i.e.
the “rules of the game.” Concerning preferences, we make the traditional assumption that, for any 𝑡 = 1, 2, ...,
every agent active at 𝑡 discounts the instantaneous payoﬀs that might be obtained at some future 𝑡′ ≥ 𝑡with the
factor 𝛿u�
′−u�, where the discount rate 𝛿 < 1 is the same for all players. This intertemporal trading game is played
under complete information on all relevant details of the situation (i.e. the payoﬀs of all agents, the prevailing
network, etc.)
As indicated, our analysis of the induced intertemporal game will focus on its Stationary Subgame Perfect
Equilibria (SSPE), i.e. Subgame Perfect Equilibria where players’ strategies are stationary and, hence, the behav-
ior they prescribe within any given period 𝑡 is independent of what happened at any 𝑡′ < 𝑡. More precisely, a
stationary strategy 𝜎u� for any given agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 ∪ 𝐵 embodies two distinct components. First, it includes, for
every 𝑗 such that 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝐿, a price 𝑝u�u� at which 𝑖 oﬀers to trade with 𝑗 when the link 𝑖𝑗 is chosen by the matching
mechanism and 𝑖 is the proposer. Thus, overall, agent 𝑖 must have a vector of such proposals pu� ≡(𝑝u�u�)u�u�∈u� for
all his partners. On the other hand, every agent 𝑖 must have a function 𝜓u�u� ∶ ℝ → {𝐴,𝑅} that speciﬁes what
price proposals from 𝑗 he will accept (𝐴) or not (𝑅). All these conditional decisions may be gathered in a vec-
torial function ψu� ≡ (𝜓u�u�)u�u�∈u� that embodies the full range of agent 𝑖’s behavior as a responder. Combining this
function with the aforementioned price oﬀer pu�, we arrive at a (stationary) strategy σu� = (pu�,ψu�) for every agent
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆∪𝐵.3 The corresponding strategy proﬁle σ ≡(σu�)u�∈u�∪u� in turn induces a unique vector of expected payoﬀs
that we shall denote by x(σ ; 𝐺, 𝜃, 𝛿) ≡(𝑥u�(σ ; 𝐺, 𝜃, 𝛿))u�∈u�∪u�, where 𝜃 ≡((𝑐u�)u�∈u�, (𝑣u�)u�∈u�) is simply a shorthand
for the combined vector of seller and buyer types. Thus, for the sake of clarity, our notation makes explicit the
dependence of payoﬀs on the strategy proﬁle σ , the underlying network 𝐺, the agents’ types, and the discount
factor 𝛿.
Given the probability distribution 𝜑u� that formalizes the matching mechanism operating on the network
𝐺, recall that 𝜋
u�u�
u� stands for the marginal probability that the pair {𝑖, 𝑗} is matched, which we assumed positive
if (and only if) 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝐿. For any such seller-buyer pair, denote by 𝑣u�u� ≡max{𝑣u� − 𝑐u�, 0} the surplus that can be
jointly produced by 𝑖 and 𝑗. Then, the requirement that any SSPE ̃σ is intertemporally self-consistent implies that
the induced payoﬀs ( ̃𝑥u�)u�∈u�∪u� must satisfy, for every 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 ≡𝑆 ∪ 𝐵, the following Bellman-like conditions:
̃𝑥u� = ∑
u�∶u�u�∈u�
𝜋
u�u�
u� (
1
2
max{𝑣u�u� − 𝛿 ̃𝑥u�, 𝛿 ̃𝑥u�} +
1
2
𝛿 ̃𝑥u�) +
⎛⎜⎜
⎝
1− ∑
u�∶u�u�∈u�
𝜋
u�u�
u�
⎞⎟⎟
⎠
𝛿 ̃𝑥u�. (1)
These conditions simply state that, at equilibrium, the payoﬀ expectation of every agent 𝑖 at any general date
𝑡 must equal the payoﬀ to be expected if he and his matched partner react optimally at that period and the
same payoﬀ is anticipated for agent 𝑖 if he is still active the following period. Nguyen (2015) and Polanski and
Lazarova (2015) have shown that the system eq. (1) has a unique solution x̃(𝐺, 𝜃, 𝛿) for any 𝐺 and 𝜃, provided
𝛿 < 1. In fact, as a generalization of Manea (2011), their results imply that for suﬀiciently high 𝛿 (i.e. 𝛿 ≥ 𝛿0 for
some 𝛿0 < 1) the subset of links that trade with positive probability at equilibrium remains ﬁxed and that the
limit equilibrium payoﬀ as 𝛿 → 1:
x∗(𝐺, 𝜃) ≡ {𝑥∗u� (𝐺, θ)}u�∈u�∪u� ≡ limu�→1
x̃(𝐺, 𝜃, 𝛿). (2)
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is well-deﬁned (and thus unique). We shall refer to x∗(𝐺, 𝜃) as the Limit Bargaining Outcome (LBO). It is worth
highlighting that the LBO is independent of the matching procedure (cf., Theorem 2 in Nguyen 2015). Hence,
the LBO is the same for any 𝜑u� such that the implied marginal probabilities satisfy 𝜋
u�u�
u� > 0 for all 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝐿 and
𝜋
u�u�
u� = 0 for all 𝑖𝑗 ∉ 𝐿. Associated to such LBO, we deﬁne the prices p
∗(𝐺, θ) ≡(𝑝∗u�u�(𝐺, 𝜃))u�u�∈u� at which trade is
conducted, if at all, in each of the links of 𝐺 at any SSPE. Speciﬁcally, if trade is conducted at some link 𝑠𝑏 ∈ 𝐿
with positive probability, the uniquely associated price is given by,4
𝑝∗u�u�(𝐺, 𝜃) = 𝑥
∗
u�(𝐺, 𝜃) + 𝑐u� = 𝑣u� − 𝑥
∗
u�(𝐺, 𝜃). (3)
Instead, if the probability that trade occurs at some link 𝑠𝑏 ∈ 𝐿 is zero, we simply write 𝑝∗u�u�(𝐺, 𝜃) = ∅. In what
follows, we will often drop the reference to 𝐺 and 𝜃 and write simply x∗ and p∗ if no confusion arises.
4 Complete TradingNetwork
We start our analysis with the case of complete bipartite networks. Essentially, this case is equivalent to that
studied by Gale (1987), where each buyer/seller matches afresh every period with some randomly selected
member of the other (continuum) population. Under these circumstances, the equilibrium price 𝑝∗ at which all
trades are conducted is given by the unique price at which the two sides of the market obtain, in aggregate, the
same share of the surplus (see Proposition 11 in Gale’s paper).
To express formally the former condition, it is convenient to introduce the following notation. Given any
price 𝑝, let 𝐵(𝑝) and 𝑆(𝑝) stand for the set of buyers and sellers, respectively, who want to trade at price 𝑝.
Formally,
𝐵(𝑝) ≡ {𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∶ 𝑣u� ≥ 𝑝}, 𝑆(𝑝) ≡ {𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 ∶ 𝑐u� ≤ 𝑝}. (4)
Then, particularized to our ﬁnite-population context, the aforementioned condition can be written as follows:
∑
u�∈u�(u�∗)
(𝑣u� − 𝑝
∗) = ∑
u�∈u�(u�∗)
(𝑝∗ − 𝑐u�), (5)
which provides an implicit (unique) determination of the equilibrium price 𝑝∗. This price determines via eq.
(3) the limit payoﬀs x∗ of players in 𝐵(𝑝∗)∪𝑆(𝑝∗) (all other agents earn zero). Equivalently, these payoﬀs obtain
as the unique solution to eq. (1) with 𝜋
u�u�
u� > 0 for all 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 × 𝐵 as 𝛿 → 1.
The above condition represents a direct generalization of the well-known result of the bilateral bargaining
model studied by Rubinstein (1982) between a single seller and a single buyer that are “inﬁnitely patient”. In
this case, the surplus is divided equally between the two agents if both have the same ex-ante probability of
being the proposer (and therefore being in a position to extract some rents). Similarly, by virtue of the extreme
patience of all agents, the two essential considerations in our context can be summarized as follows:
i. All trades must take place at the same price.
ii. Given (i), from the point of view of any single agent, the opposite side of the market can be suitably
conceived as represented by an “average player.”
Hence if (as we have assumed) the probability of being the proposer in any matched pair is the same for the
two sides, then the surplus earned in total by each side of the market must be equal – just as in the simple
Rubinstein’s two-agent context. This is precisely what eq. (5) asserts.
Note that the former reasoning is independent of howoften any particular agent is selected to be the proposer.
As a whole, each side of the market enjoys the same probability and thus, also as a whole, both sides must earn
the same share of the surplus.5Note, further, that item (i) is of course crucially dependent on the completeness of
the network. In the absence of this completeness, the considerations illustrated in Figure 1 come into play, with
the interaction between network architecture and the proﬁle of types determining whether eﬀective arbitrage
possibilities are in place. A full characterization of this problem is developed in the next section.
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5 PriceDetermination inGeneral TradingNetworks
We start with a deﬁnition of the key concept involved in our analysis.
Deﬁnition
Given a proﬁle of costs and valuations, 𝜃 = ((𝑐u�)u�∈u�, (𝑣u�)u�∈u�), and a bipartite network 𝐺 = {𝑆 ∪ 𝐵, 𝐿},
the pair(𝐺, 𝜃)is said to be an Uniform-Price Conﬁguration (UPC) if the corresponding equilibrium price vector
p∗(𝐺, 𝜃) =(𝑝∗u�u�(𝐺, 𝜃))u�u�∈u�obtained from eq. (3) satisﬁes for all links𝑖𝑗, 𝑘𝑙 ∈ 𝐿,
𝑝∗u�u�(𝐺, 𝜃) ≠ ∅ ≠ 𝑝
∗
u�u�(𝐺, 𝜃) ⇒ 𝑝
∗
u�u�(𝐺, 𝜃) = 𝑝
∗
u�u�(𝐺, 𝜃).
As illustrated in Figure 1, whether price uniformity prevails at equilibrium depends on how the trading
network interplays with the type proﬁle of costs and valuations. Two polar cases are straightforward. On the
one hand, if the network is complete, the conﬁguration must always induce a uniform price whatever the type
proﬁle. In contrast, if the trading network is segmented into several components, it is clear that only exception-
ally (i.e. non-generically) one can expect that trade will be conducted at a uniform price. In contrast to these
two extreme cases, the most interesting situations lie in the intermediate scenario in which the trading network
is connected (i.e. displays a single component) but is well below being complete. In those cases, understanding
when a uniform-price outcome obtains is not so clear. To address the problem, a general characterization of
uniform-price conﬁgurations is provided by the Proposition below.
To state our result formally, the following two pieces of notation are useful.
– First, given any subset of sellers 𝑆′ ⊆ 𝑆 and buyers 𝐵′ ⊆ 𝐵, let 𝑝′ ≡ 𝒫(𝑆′, 𝐵′) be the (unique) price that
satisﬁes:
∑
u�∈u�(u�′)∩u�′
(𝑣u� − 𝑝
′) = ∑
u�∈u�(u�′)∩u�′
(𝑝′ − 𝑐u�). (6)
A natural interpretation of 𝑝′ is the uniform price that would notionally prevail in a game in which sellers
in 𝑆′ were completely connected to buyers in 𝐵′ in the network𝐺′ ={𝑆′∪𝐵′, 𝐿′}with 𝐿′ ={𝑠𝑏 ∶ 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆′, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵′}.
– Second, for any subset of sellers 𝑆′ ⊆ 𝑆 denote by𝑁u�(𝑆
′) the set of buyers 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 that are connected to some
seller 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆′ in the bipartite network 𝐺 = {𝑆 ∪ 𝐵, 𝐿}. That is, 𝑁u�(𝑆
′) ≡{𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∶ ∃𝑠 ∈ 𝑆′s.t.𝑠𝑏 ∈ 𝐿}. Similarly,
we deﬁne 𝑁u�(𝐵
′) ≡{𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 ∶∃𝑏 ∈ 𝐵′ s.t.𝑏𝑠 ∈ 𝐿}.
For the sake of formal simplicity, we assume also that all nodes have a partner with whom they can conceivably
trade at some mutually beneﬁcial price – otherwise, the nodes for which this condition does not apply are just
“dummies” and can be safely ignored in the analysis. That is, we make the following assumption:
Assumption
PL (Proﬁtable Links) For every seller 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 there is some buyer 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 such that 𝑠𝑏 ∈ 𝐿 and 𝑣u� > 𝑐u�. Similarly,
for every buyer 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 there is some seller 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 such that 𝑏𝑠 ∈ 𝐿 and
𝑐u� < 𝑣u�.
We can now state and prove the following characterization result.
Proposition 1
Consider a bipartite network 𝐺 = {𝑆 ∪ 𝐵, 𝐿} and a type proﬁle 𝜃 =((𝑐u�)u�∈u�,(𝑣u�)u�∈u�) for which Assumption
PL holds. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(𝐺, 𝜃) is a Uniform-Price Conﬁguration, (7)
∀𝐵′ ⊆ 𝐵, 𝐵′ ≠ ∅, 𝒫(𝑁u�(𝐵
′), 𝐵′) ≤ 𝒫(𝑆, 𝐵), (8)
∀𝑆′ ⊆ 𝑆, 𝑆′ ≠ ∅, 𝒫(𝑆′, 𝑁u�(𝑆
′)) ≥ 𝒫(𝑆, 𝐵). (9)
Proof
See the Appendix.
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Informally, our result indicates that any given conﬁguration is an UPC if, and only if, any of the following
equivalent (and symmetric) conditions for buyers and sellers hold:
i. For buyers, each subset of them must be collectively connected to relatively enough low-cost sellers such
that they cannot be forced into accepting prices that are higher than the price 𝑝∗ that all buyers would pay
in the absence of trading frictions.
ii. For sellers, each subset of them has to be collectively connected to relatively enough high-valuation buyers
such that they cannot be forced into accepting prices that are lower than 𝑝∗, the price that all sellers would
receive in the absence of trading frictions.
To understand the intuition for the equivalence of eqs (7), (8), and (9) the essential argument can be explained
as follows. First, let us argue that either eqs (8) or (9) separately imply (7) – i.e. uniform pricing. We start by the
observation that if trading at equilibrium is not conducted at a uniform price, then there must be two distinct
prices, say 𝑝u� and 𝑝u�, that satisfy 𝑝u� > 𝑝
∗ ≡ 𝒫(𝑆, 𝐵) > 𝑝u�. This reﬂects the fact that whenever the creation of
additional links leads to the merger of two trading components6 into a single one, the induced (uniform) price
lies at some intermediate “compromise” between the two original prices (see Lemma 2). The key intuition
here is that, whenever any active links are formed across the formerly independent trading components, the
relatively weak part in each of those components (buyers in one, sellers in the other) cannot become worse-oﬀ.
Thus, in the single integrated component that results, the prevailing uniform price must lie in between the two
former prices. An analogous conclusion can be readily extended to the general case of any number of trading
components, with 𝑝u� and 𝑝u� now standing for the highest and lowest prices prevailing across all components.
Then, to complete the explanation of this ﬁrst part of the proposition, consider any conﬁguration (𝐺, 𝜃)
where eq. (7) fails and denote by 𝐵′ the set of buyers who are in the component trading at the highest price
𝑝u�. If, hypothetically, these buyers were connected to the sellers in 𝑁u�(𝐵
′) through a complete and isolated
(bipartite) subnetwork, those buyers could not do any better than in the original full network. Heuristically,
the reason is that, under those circumstances, we are “artiﬁcially” ignoring the additional bargaining options
that the sellers in 𝑁u�(𝐵
′) actually enjoy in the network 𝐺, i.e. their links to buyers outside 𝐵′. This, in eﬀect,
contradicts eq. (8) and thus explains why eqs (7) implies (8). A symmetric idea applies to eq. (9), the focus then
turning to the lowest price 𝑝u� and the set of sellers trading at that price.
Finally, we explain the reciprocal statement that eq. (7) implies both eqs (8) and (9). Since the argument again
applies to buyers and sellers symmetrically and separately, let us focus on the condition in eq. (8) that refers to
buyers. Suppose that this latter condition fails and thus we have some set of buyers 𝐵′ such that, if connected
in a complete subnetwork to 𝑁u�(𝐵
′), the (uniform) price 𝑝1 they would attain is higher than 𝑝
∗ ≡ 𝒫(𝑆, 𝐵). Let
𝑆′ stand for the set of sellers not connected to 𝐵′ – i.e. 𝑆′ ≡ 𝑆\𝑁u�(𝐵
′) – and denote by 𝑝2 the uniform price that
prevails in a trading component where 𝑆′ is completely connected to 𝐵\𝐵′. Applying again the reasoning used
above, 𝑝∗ must be conceived as a “compromise” between 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, and therefore 𝑝1 > 𝑝
∗ > 𝑝2.
Consider then the network constructed as follows: all buyers in 𝐵′ are completely connected to the sellers
in 𝑁u�(𝐵
′) and all sellers in 𝑆\𝑁u�(𝐵
′) are completely connected to the buyers in 𝐵\𝐵′. This, in short, is simply
the complete bipartite network between the full sets 𝐵 and 𝑆 except for all the links between buyers in 𝐵\𝐵′ and
the sellers in 𝑁u�(𝐵
′). Let us refer to this network as 𝐺′, and note that the original 𝐺 is a subnetwork of it. It is
clear that, in the conﬁguration (𝐺′, 𝜃), an equilibrium can be constructed where all sellers in 𝑁u�(𝐵
′) are only
willing to trade with buyers in 𝐵′ at price 𝑝1 > 𝑝
∗, while all buyers in 𝐵\𝐵′ are only willing to trade with sellers
in 𝑆\𝑁u�(𝐵
′) at price 𝑝2 < 𝑝
∗. Since𝐺 ⊂ 𝐺′, this contradicts the assertion that all trade in the conﬁguration (𝐺, 𝜃)
is conducted at a uniform price.
A quite intuitive application of Proposition 1 arises for the particular case where costs and valuations are
homogeneous within each side of the market. In this case, eq. (6) simpliﬁes to,
𝒫(𝑁u�(𝐵
′), 𝐵′) =
#(𝐵′)
#(𝐵′) + #(𝑁u�(𝐵′))
, 𝒫(𝑆′, 𝑁u�(𝑆
′)) =
#(𝑁u�(𝑆
′))
#(𝑆′) + #(𝑁u�(𝑆′))
, (10)
where #(⋅) represents the cardinality of the set in question. Hence, in particular, for a completely connected
component of the trading network (which, of course, also deﬁnes a single trading component) the single price
prevailing in it simply reﬂects the buyer-seller ratio in that component. For example, in the network of Figure 1,
𝑝∗ ≡𝒫(𝑆, 𝐵) = 1
2
since there are as many sellers as buyers in that market. In contrast, if we consider for example
the subset of buyers given by 𝐵′ ={9, 10}, we obtain:
𝒫(𝑁u�(𝐵
′), 𝐵′) = 𝒫({5}, {9, 10}) = 2/3 > 𝑝∗,
7
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which violates Condition eq. (8). This indicates that the conﬁguration given by the trading network represented
in Figure 1 with homogeneous costs and valuations induces price dispersion, i.e. it is not a UPC.7
Within an homogeneous buyer and seller context, a straightforward observation is that Conditions in eqs
(8) and (9) are formally equivalent to those put forward by the celebrated Marriage Theorem (see Hall 1935, or
Chartrand 1985) to characterize the bipartite networks that admit a so-called perfect matching – i.e. a matching
where every node of either part (“man” or “woman”) ismatchedwith one (and only one) node of the other part.
To see this note that, once the relevant prices have been computed from eq. (10), the aforementioned conditions
can be written as follows:
∀𝐵′ ⊆ 𝐵, 𝐵′ ≠ ∅, #(u�
′)
#(u�u�(u�′))
≤ #(u�)
#(u�)
,
∀𝑆′ ⊆ 𝑆, 𝑆′ ≠ ∅, #(u�
′)
#(u�u�(u�′))
≤ #(u�)
#(u�)
.
Therefore, if #𝑆 = #𝐵, they become:
∀𝐵′ ⊆ 𝐵, 𝐵′ ≠ ∅, #(𝐵′) ≤ #(𝑁u�(𝐵
′)),
∀𝑆′ ⊆ 𝑆, 𝑆′ ≠ ∅, #(𝑆′) ≤ #(𝑁u�(𝑆
′)).
The above conditions simply specify that every subset of agents on one side of the market is connected to a set
on the other side that is at least as numerous. This are precisely the conditions established by Hall’s Marriage
Theorem as necessary and suﬀicient for a perfect matching.
In fact, the previous observation immediately follows from a result established by Manea (2011). He shows
that, for homogeneous buyer-seller networks, a uniform price arises out of bargaining among inﬁnitely patient
agents if, and only if, the trading network admits a perfect matching. Thus, in this light, what our above dis-
cussion suggests is that a natural interpretation of Proposition 1 can be cast along the following lines. When
one moves from a fully homogeneous environment to an heterogeneous one with arbitrary cost and valuation
proﬁles, uniform-price conﬁgurations may be characterized by “economic conditions” that generalize those of
the Marriage Theorem through the consideration of suitably determined (endogenous) prices. These prices, in
essence, reﬂect the relative “scarcity” of valuable bargaining partners faced by every possible subset of buyers
or sellers.
6 SummingUp
When the market consists of heterogeneous buyers and sellers, eﬀective arbitrage possibilities derive from a
complex interaction of valuations, costs, and the architecture of the network of trading possibilities. In this con-
text, purely topological considerations cannot provide a suitable analysis of the eﬀective frictions impinging on
the market. A proper understanding of the problem can only be achieved by an integration of topological fea-
tures and individual characteristics (costs and valuations). This is precisely the approach pursued by our main
result, which provides conditions that characterize conﬁgurations that are frictionless in the sense of inducing
a uniform price across all trades. These conditions formally resemble those highlighted by the graph-theoretic
matching literature but introduce the canonical economicmechanism, prices, in assessing the eﬀective bargain-
ing possibilities of agents that can be quite heterogeneous – not only in terms of their network position but also
in terms of their individual inherent characteristics.
Appendix
In thisAppendix,we provide the formal proof of ourmain result, Proposition 1. The proof relies on two separate
Lemmas, which are stated and proven ﬁrst.
Lemma 1
Let the bipartite network 𝐺 = {𝐵 ∪ 𝑆, 𝐿} and type proﬁle 𝜃 =((𝑐u�)u�∈u�, (𝑣u�)u�∈u�) deﬁne an UPC (𝐺, 𝜃) with
a trading price 𝑝. Consider the network 𝐺′ ={𝐵 ∪ 𝑆,𝐿 ∪ {𝑠′𝑏′}}, with 𝑠′ ∈ 𝑆, 𝑏′ ∈ 𝐵, and 𝑠′𝑏′ ∉ 𝐿. Then, (𝐺′, 𝜃)
deﬁnes an UPC with the same trading price 𝑝.
Proof : Let x∗(𝐺, 𝜃) be the LBO induced by the UPC (𝐺, 𝜃)where all trades occur at the price 𝑝. By Theorem
2 in Nguyen (2015), this outcome is the unique solution to the following (quadratic) optimization problem:
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min
x
(∑
u�∈u�
𝑥2u� +∑u�∈u� 𝑥
2
u�), 𝑠.𝑡. ∀𝑠𝑏 ∈ 𝐿, 𝑥u� + 𝑥u� ≥ max{𝑣u� − 𝑐u�, 0}. (11)
Consider any seller 𝑠 and buyer 𝑏 such that 𝑐u� ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑣u�. Their equilibrium payoﬀs must then be, respectively,
given by 𝑥∗u� =𝑝− 𝑐u� and 𝑥
∗
u� =𝑣u� − 𝑝. To see this, consider the case of the seller 𝑠. Either some of her neighboring
buyers in 𝐺 trade at price 𝑝 with other buyers or they do not trade at all. In the former case, seller 𝑠 can also
trade at price 𝑝. In the latter case, instead, by Assumption PL, there is some price at which 𝑠 can trade proﬁtably
with some of his neighboring buyers. Thus, seller 𝑠 must be active at equilibrium and his trading price must
also be 𝑝, since the conﬁguration (𝐺, 𝜃) is an UPC.
Note that the preceding argument applies to any seller-buyer pair (𝑠, 𝑏), independently of whether they are
connected in 𝐺 or not. Thus suppose that the link 𝑠′𝑏′ added to 𝐺 to obtain 𝐺′ indeed satisﬁes 𝑐u�′ ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑣u�′.
Then, the solution to the optimization problem eq. (11) must satisfy:
𝑥∗u�′ + 𝑥
∗
u�′ = 𝑝 − 𝑐u�′ + 𝑣u�′ − 𝑝 = 𝑣u�′ − 𝑐u�′, (12)
which implies that adding the constraint 𝑥∗u�′+𝑥
∗
u�′ ≥𝑣u�′−𝑐u�′ is redundant, and therefore x
∗(𝐺, 𝜃) is still a solution
to the optimization problem obtained after adding this constraint. This means that x∗(𝐺′, 𝜃) =x∗(𝐺, θ).
Consider now the alternative case inwhich the link 𝑠′𝑏′ added to𝐺does not satisfy 𝑐u�′ ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑣u�′. For concrete-
ness, suppose that 𝑐u�′ ≤ 𝑣u�′ ≤ 𝑝. Then seller 𝑠
′ trades in 𝐺 but the buyer 𝑏′ does not. Hence the corresponding
payoﬀs satisfy 𝑥∗u�′ =𝑝 − 𝑐u�′, 𝑥
∗
u�′ = 0 and, therefore,
𝑥∗u�′ + 𝑥
∗
u�′ = 𝑝 − 𝑐u�′ > 𝑣u�′ − 𝑐u�′.
Hence, again, if the link 𝑠′𝑏′ is added to 𝐺 and the constraint 𝑥∗u�′ +𝑥
∗
u�′ ≥𝑣u�′ − 𝑐u�′ is added to eq. (11) the solution
remains unchanged. Thus, as before, we ﬁnd that x∗(𝐺′, 𝜃) =x∗(𝐺, 𝜃), which completes the proof of the Lemma.
□
Lemma 2
For any disjoint non-empty subsets 𝑆′, 𝑆′′ ⊆ 𝑆 and 𝐵′, 𝐵′′ ⊆ 𝐵 in the bipartite network 𝐺 = {𝐵 ∪ 𝑆, 𝐿} with
the type proﬁle 𝜃 =((𝑐u�)u�∈u�, (𝑣u�)u�∈u�) it holds that,
𝒫(𝑆′, 𝐵′) < 𝒫(𝑆′′, 𝐵′′) ⇒ 𝒫(𝑆′, 𝐵′) < 𝒫(𝑆′ ∪ 𝑆′′, 𝐵′ ∪ 𝐵′′) < 𝒫(𝑆′′, 𝐵′′),
where 𝒫(.) is deﬁned in eq. (6).
Proof : By the deﬁnition eq. (6) and by the fact that 𝑆′ ∩ 𝑆′′ = ∅ and 𝐵′ ∩ 𝐵′′ = ∅, it follows for 𝑝 = 𝒫(𝑆′ ∪
𝑆′′, 𝐵′ ∪ 𝐵′′) that,
∑
u�∈u�(u�)∩u�′
(𝑣u� − 𝑝) + ∑
u�∈u�(u�)∩u�′′
(𝑣u� − 𝑝) = ∑
u�∈u�(u�)∩u�′
(𝑝 − 𝑐u�) + ∑
u�∈u�(u�)∩u�′′
(𝑝 − 𝑐u�).
We write the last equality as 𝑓 (𝑝; 𝐵′, 𝑆′) + 𝑓 (𝑝; 𝐵′′, 𝑆′′) = 0, where,
𝑓 (𝑝; 〰𝐵, ̃𝑆) ≡ ∑
u�∈u�(u�)∩ũ�
(𝑣u� − 𝑝) − ∑
u�∈u�(u�)∩u�
(𝑝 − 𝑐u�), ∀〰𝐵 ⊆ 𝐵, ̃𝑆 ⊆ 𝑆.
Clearly, the function 𝑓 (𝑝; .) is strictly decreasing in 𝑝 ∈ 𝑅. Then, we have for 𝑝′ = 𝒫(𝑆′, 𝐵′) <𝑝′′ = 𝒫(𝑆′′, 𝐵′′)
the following inequalities,
𝑓 (𝑝′; 𝐵′, 𝑆′) = 0 ⇒ 𝑓 (𝑝′; 𝐵′, 𝑆′) + 𝑓 (𝑝′; 𝐵′′, 𝑆′′) = 𝑓 (𝑝′; 𝐵′′, 𝑆′′) > 0,
𝑓 (𝑝′′; 𝐵′′, 𝑆′′) = 0 ⇒ 𝑓 (𝑝′′; 𝐵′, 𝑆′) + 𝑓 (𝑝′′; 𝐵′′, 𝑆′′) = 𝑓 (𝑝′′; 𝐵′, 𝑆′) < 0.
As the function 𝑓 (𝑝; .) is also continuous, it follows that there is a unique 𝑝 ∈ 𝑅 solving 𝑓 (𝑝; 𝐵′, 𝑆′)+𝑓 (𝑝; 𝐵′′, 𝑆′′) =
0 and 𝑝 ∈ (𝑝′, 𝑝′′). □
Proof of Proposition 1
We establish the desired equivalence by proving in turn a suﬀicient set of diﬀerent implications.
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– (8)⇒(7):
For the sake of contradiction, assume that the condition in eq. (8) holds but (𝐺, 𝜃) is not an UPC. Then, there
are at least two connected and disjoint subnetworks 𝐺′ and 𝐺′′ of 𝐺, where trade takes place at the uniform
prices 𝑝′ and 𝑝′′, respectively, such that 𝑝′ ≠𝑝′′. We will call each such subnetwork a trading component (TC). In
each TC of𝐺, we add allmissing links until all buyers and sellers in this component are connected by a complete
subnetwork. By Lemma 1, this will not aﬀect the price in this component. Each node that does not belong to any
TC (i.e., does not trade in equilibrium) is connected to at least one trading node due to our Assumption PL. For
any such non-trading player 𝑣, we select one of her trading neighbors in some TC and connect 𝑣 to all players
from the opposite side in this TC. Again, this operation will not change the price in 𝐺′ as 𝑣will be still inactive.
Thus, we obtain a collection of completely connected TCs that cover disjoint sets of nodes, whose union is 𝑆∪𝐵,
and each TC displays a uniform price.
If we now add all missing links between two completely connected TCs with the respective prices 𝑝′ and 𝑝′′,
then Lemma 2 implies that the price in the merged component lies in the interval (𝑝′, 𝑝′′). If we proceed in this
way iteratively merging components, we will arrive at the completely connected bipartite network with the set
of nodes 𝑆∪𝐵, where all trade takes place at the price 𝑝∗ = 𝒫(𝐵, 𝑆). By the iterative application of Lemma 2, this
price must lie strictly between the minimum 𝑝u� and the maximum 𝑝u� price of the initial completely connected
TCs,
𝑝u� < 𝑝
∗ = 𝒫(𝐵, 𝑆) < 𝑝u�.
Now, denote by 𝐻 a trading component with the price 𝑝u�. Furthermore, let 𝐻u� and 𝐻u� be, respectively, the
(non-empty) set of active buyers and sellers in 𝐻. Note that any active seller 𝑠 ∈ 𝑁u�(𝐻u�) (who must of course
have her cost 𝑐u� ≤ 𝑝u�) will sell at equilibrium only at the highest price 𝑝u�, since this price is available to her.
Hence, we can write 𝐻u� = 𝑁u�(𝐻u�) and, therefore,
𝒫(𝐻u�, 𝐻u�) = 𝒫(𝐻u�, 𝑁u�(𝐻u�)) = 𝑝u� > 𝑝
∗,
which contradicts eq. (8).
– (7)⇒(8):
For the sake of contradiction assume that (𝐺, 𝜃) is UPC but eq. (8) does not hold. Then, there exists a non-empty
set 𝐵′ ⊆ 𝐵 such that,
𝒫(𝐵′, 𝑁u�(𝐵
′)) = 𝑝1 > 𝑝
∗ ≡ 𝒫(𝐵, 𝑆). (13)
We add all missing links between 𝐵′ and 𝑁u�(𝐵
′) until these two sets are connected by a complete subnetwork
𝐺1 and we do the same for the sets 𝑆
′ =𝑆\𝑁u�(𝐵
′) and 𝑁u�(𝑆
′) obtaining the complete subnetwork 𝐺2 (𝐺1 and
𝐺2 are only connected by links between 𝑁u�(𝑆
′) and 𝑁u�(𝐵
′)). We denote by 〰𝐺 the entire network that resulted
from this link addition to 𝐺 and note that ( 〰𝐺, 𝜃) is an UPC by the Lemma 1.
Considering now 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 separately (i.e., ignoring all links between them), they cover disjoint sets of
nodes, whose union is 𝑆 ∪ 𝐵, and each subnetwork displays a uniform price due to their completeness. Then,
Lemma 2 and 𝑝1 > 𝑝
∗ imply that 𝑝2 must verify,
𝑝2 = 𝒫(𝑁u�(𝑆
′), 𝑆′) < 𝑝∗.
Considering now the entire network 〰𝐺, trading at 𝑝u� in its subnetwork 𝐺u�, 𝑘 = 1, 2, and disagreement (no
trade) for any connected pair (𝑠, 𝑏) ∈𝐺1 × 𝐺2 forms a limit SSPE with the (unique) expected payoﬀ vector x
∗.
In particular, it is optimal not to trade for each pair (𝑠, 𝑏) ∈𝑁u�(𝐵
′) × 𝑁u�(𝑆
′), i.e., 𝑠 ∈ 𝐺1, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐺2, as the sum of
their expected payoﬀs is higher than their joint surplus,
𝑥∗u� + 𝑥
∗
u� = max{𝑝1 − 𝑐u�, 0} +max{𝑣u� − 𝑝2, 0} ≥ max{𝑝1 − 𝑐u� + 𝑣u� − 𝑝2, 0} > 𝑣u� − 𝑐u�.
As the equilibrium trade in 〰𝐺 occurs at two diﬀerent prices, 𝑝1 > 𝑝2, the conﬁguration ( 〰𝐺, 𝜃) cannot be an UPC.
Given the formal symmetry between buyers and sellers in the model, it is clear that it readily follows that
both (7)⇒( 9) and (9)⇒(7). This establishes the equivalence among eqs (7), (8), and (9), thus completing the
proof. □
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Notes
1For example, Donna, Schenone, and Veramendi (2015) highlight the following cases: labor markets ( Mortensen 2005), eBay ( Einav et
al. 2015), and automobile markets ( Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 2001).
2See Section 5 for a detailed explanation of how equilibrium prices are determined when agents become inﬁnitely patient.
3In principle, players’ strategies could also depend on the realized matching. However, equilibrium strategies will not depend on it - as
the SSPE condition eq. (1) shows - due to their assumed stationarity and the fact that the market composition is taken to be stationary as
well.
4From eq. (3) it obviously follows that each trading pair u�u� exhausts thewhole surplus u�u�u�. That is, we have that u�∗u�(u�, u�)+u�
∗
u�(u�, u�) =u�u�−
u�u� = u�
u�u�.
5Obviously, this is a particular manifestation of the indicated general independence of the LBO on the matching procedure given by
u�u�. In the present case, where the network is complete, the intuitive basis for this conclusion is easier to understand.
6A trading component is simply deﬁned as a component of the subnetwork of u� consisting of all links that are active at equilibrium,
i.e. those that support trade with positive probability.
7As a further illustration of Proposition 1, let us still focus on the trading network displayed in Figure 1 but now consider, as we did in
the Introduction, the heterogeneous environment obtained from the homogeneous one by changing the valuation of buyer 8 to u�8 = 10, while
all other costs and valuations remain unchanged. Then eq. (6) implies u�∗ ≡𝒫(u�,u�) = 2 and we ﬁnd that the subset u�′ ={1} violates the
Conditions eq. (9) as 𝒫({1}, {6, 7})= 2/3 <u�∗. Instead, it may be easily checked that if the change involves u�3 =u�4 =1/4, and u�9 =u�10 =3/4
(another case considered in the Introduction), Conditions eqs (8) and (9) are satisﬁed, thus implying that the induced conﬁguration yields
a uniform price.
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